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1. Introduction
The subject of this paper is the relationship between the inescapable
positionality ofobservations and the demands ofobjectivity in science
and practical reason. What we observe depends on our position vis-a
vis the object of observation, and that positionality relates to a num
ber of parameters—locational and others—that influence acts of
observation. But even though observationsare parametrically variable
with positions, they are central to our understanding of the world, and
thus to science, decisions,and ethics.Objectivity would seem to demand
some kind of invariancewith respect to particular characteristics of the
observer and her circumstances. But the question is: which character
istics should figure in the invariance conditions—and no less impor
tantly, which must not so figure?2
It is not surprising that objectivity has been seen as a demand for
"a view from nowhere" (to quote the title of Thomas Nagel's impor
tant bookon that subject).31 shall argue that even though thisway of
seeing objectivity isadvantageousand helpful in many respects (Nagel's
illuminating analysis is an excellent example of the fruilfulness of this
approach), it is nevertheless misleading in some crucial respects. It is
with those respects that I am primarily concerned in this paper.
I shalldistinguish between two conceptsof objectivity: (1) positional
objectivity, and (2) /rans-positional objectivity. Briefly put (though
with some oversimplification, as willbe discussed later), the distinction
is this. How an object appears from a certain position of observation
isan objective inquiry in which the observationalposition isspecified
(rather than being treated as an unspecified intrusion—a scientific nui
sance) . Anyattempt at non-positional objectivityhas to start with knowl
edge based on positional observations and then go beyond that, and
in that sense this is reallyan idea of fra/w-posilional objectivity (rather
than one that does without positional objectivity altogether).
Positional objectivity is of interest both in itself and as the crucial
building block of trans-positional objectivity. I shall discuss the rele
vance of positional perspectiveson objectivity in, respectively, science,
decision theory, ethics, and public affairs. But, first, some conceptual
distinctions.
2. Subjectivity Distinguished from PositionalVariability
Is positional variability related to the lackof objectivity in anyway?
There are someconnectionshere, but we have to be careful in deciding
on what they are. In The Viewfrom Nowhere, Thomas Nagel has com
mented on an aspect of these connections.
A view or form of thought is more objective than another if it
relies less on the specificsof the individual's makeup and po
sition in the world, or on the character of the particular type
of creature he is.1
This is a good way of beginning to see a distinction that may be sig
nificant, but we must also inquire what exactly the exercise is in which
positional variability is to be interpreted. Its relevance must depend
on the nature of the inquiry. If, for example, weare trying to find out
how a phenomenon would appear to a person occupying a particular
position, then clearly that positional view of the phenomenon is ex
actly what we are looking for. It is, then, part and parcel of that ob
jective inquiry, rather than an illegitimate incursion of subjective
features.
Positionalvariability does not necessarily provide counterevidence
to the objectivity of observational statements. If I say that the moon
looks small from where I am, I need not be accused of deep subjec
tivity—another person seeing the moon from where I am could con
firm that observationalfad. Nor is that observational claim contradicted
by what we know—from other evidence—about the mass of the moon,
or bythe fact that the moon looked bigenough to NeilArmstrong while
taking his "one small step for a man, one giant leap for mankind."
Indeed, in an obvious sense, there can be no view from nowhere.
What can be taken as a viewfrom nowhere must, in some ways, be a
constructed and scrutinized derivation based ultimately on the views
from particular positions. Positional parameters need not, of course,
be seen in spatial terms only—as in the simple examples chosen to il
lustrate positionality, and can involve different types of influences on
observation. Since all observations are position-dependent, positional
observations are central to science and provide the primary informa
tion on the basis of which position-independent generalizations may be
eventually constructed.
Furthermore, sometimes we may be interested precisely in the po
sitional observations themselves—those maybe the objects of our inquiry.
The fact that this is perhaps more likely to be the case in social sub-
jects and in ethics (on which more presently) than in the natural sci
ences is an important methodological issue. But this does not make
the occurrence of positional variability a peculiar feature of the social
sciences or ethics.
Indeed, modern physics is directly—and deeply—concerned with
the influence of the positional parameters of observations on what is
observed, and there is no general contrast here with the need for a cor
respondingrecognition in the social sciences.5 Whatis, however, of par
ticular importance in the social sciences is the extent to which specific
positional viewsmay themselves be the exact objects of inquiry, rather
than being of interest only as waysof getting at some kind of a trans-
positional understanding. Thus, even though significant positional
variability of observations is not at all a distinctive feature of socia/sub
jects only, nevertheless the particular interest in the positional variability
of observations can be especiallycentral to the enterprise ofsocial knowl
edge. However, that direct and intrinsic interest in positional obser
vations does not make those observations, in any sense, subjective.
Butwhat is this idea ofsubjectivity fromwhich I am uying to distinguish
the notion ofpositional relativity?Am I using some odd notion ofsub
jectivity—diflerent from common use—to make these distinctions? I
would argue that, on the contraiy, the commonly shared idea of sub
jectivity is much in line with the usage here. In the Oxford English Dic
tionary subjectivityischaracterized as: (1) "having itssource in the mind,"
and (2) "pertaining or peculiar to an individual subject or his mental
operations."The first feature, which I shall call "mental manufacture,"
relates to the inward-looking nature of subjective judgements or theo
ries. The honest racist who is persuaded without any attempt at actual
observation that members of a certain race suffer from some terrible
character defects is subjective in relying on his personal imagination
on matters in which observations—direct or indirect—must be im
portantly relevant. Objectivity here willdemand the use ofcareful ob
servations (rather than mental manufacture), even though it must
come to terms with the inescapable fact that what is actually observed
may be significantly dependent on the position from which the ob
servation is undertaken.
The second aspect (that is, "pertaining or peculiar to an individ
ual subject or his mental operations") has a different, though not un
related, focus. I shall call this the aspect of "person sensitivity." No matter
how exactly it is characterized, objectivity must satisfysome require
ments of inter-personal invariance. An observation may be inevitably po
sition-dependent, but it would lack something in credibility if others
viewing the object from the same parametric position could not see
what this subject sees. The demands of objectivity—positional as well
as trans-positional objectivity—have to go beyond relying entirely on
personally peculiar observationsthat odiers cannot reproduce even when
they share the same position.
We have to distinguish clearly between personal invariance and posi
tionalinvariance. On the other hand, what is included in the list of posi
tional parameters is itself open to variation. In this sense, positional
objectivity is a parametriccharacteristic, the exact implications ofwhich
would varywith the alteration of the specified positional parameters. This
parametric variability is no embarrassment for the approach outlined
here. Quite the contraiy—it is an essential part of it. But the paramet
ric specifications can change the nature of the exercise altogether.
Indeed, if mental tendencies as well as personal peculiarities are all in
cludedva the specified positional parameters, then subjective observations
involving clear cases of "mental manufacture" and "person sensitivity"
would also be positionally objective in that thoroughly sf)ecified position.
The importance of the distinction between subjectivity and posi
tional objectivity lies in the fact that parametric specification need not
take that extreme form. Indeed, in most cases the parametric specifi
cations will be lessexhaustive,and the problem of /waV/an-relativity would
not be trivially reduced to that of />mon-relativity. Some problems re
lated to the issue of parametric specification are taken up in section
4, after discussing the concept of trans-positional objectivity.
3. Positional and Trans-positional Objectivity
While the main subject matter of this paper is positional objectiv
ity, I am not trying to argue here that there is nothing deeper in ob
jectivity than the idea of "positional objectivity." Rather, the claims
include: (1) that "the view from nowhere" is not our onlyconcern in
assessing objectivity—there are important problems of positional ob
jectivity (related to parametric specification of positions), and (2) that
"the view from nowhere" is really a matter of "trans-positional objec
tivity"—relyingon but going beyond positional objectivity itself. Posi
tional objectivity is important both because the positional view may be
itself interesting, and because the positional observations have to be
the building blocks of more demanding kinds of objectivity that may
be sought.
Trans-positional assessment involves discriminating aggregation.
There is, of course, no guarantee that an appropriate trans-positional
view must always exist, nor that it would be unambiguous when it
would exist. The analytical problems involved in such aggregation, in
cluding the criteria that may be employed, are not altogether differ
ent from those that have become familiar in the context of other
exercises in social aggregation, e.g., in social choice theory, involving
differentmethodsofscrutinized combination.6 The positional param
eters can be taken to be specifying different "individual" viewswhich
would have to be "aggregated" together with appropriate discrimina
tion to arrive at a combined view (a constructive "view from nowhere").
There are many different types of criteria. For example, a particu
lar positional view mayget priority because it might help to "tie up" other
positional observations in a coherent way.7 The diagnosis of subjectiv
ity in trans-positional claims may be connected with rejecting generally
perspicuous criteria and preferring to go by positional observations from
personal standpoints despite those observations being lessaccessible and
less integrablewith other knowledge.8 Even though trans-positional ob
jectivity cannot be dissociated from positional views in general, it can
not be arbitrarily anchored to any chosen positional view either.
4. Implicit Trans-positionalily and Constrained Objectivity
The contrast between "positional" and "trans-positional" objectiv
ity is not as sharp as it may first appear. Positional specifications tend
to be typically incomplete, and some implicit trans-positional assess
ment is standardly involved in examining objectivity from some spec
ified—but not exhaustively specified—position.
The issue of positional specifications has far-reaching significance.
If we take a deterministic view of causation, it can be argued that any
one's actualobservation of any object can be entirely accounted for by
an adequate specification of his or her positional parameters vis-a-vis
the object. If those parameters were all to be specified as part of the
positional identification, then the observation based on those parameters
would be positionally objective in that constrained situation—and fully
explainable to others. In this sense, any actual observation (to be dis
tinguished from a report on—or an accountof—an observation) can be
seen as positionally objective for some appropriately thorough specifi
cation ofpositional parameters. Clearly subjective features influencing
an observation would, then, be included'm the specified positional pa
rameters.
If a person who is terribly scared mistakenly sees a rolled umbrella
in the hands of another person as a gun, the (trans-positional) unob-
jectivity of the observation that the other person had a gun does not
contradict the positional objectivity of his seeing what seemed to him to
be a gun. Bybringing in all the positionalparameters (including hisbeing
deeply scared), his observation can be made accessible to and under
standable by others, given the extensive specification of circumstances
and mental states. On the other hand, ifwedo not specifythe position
with all those parameters, and simplyask whether a person encounter
ing another with a rolled umbrella in good light would be objective in
taking that umbrella to be a gun, the answer could certainly be "no."
The distinction here has some relevance to understanding the concept
of "the reasonable man" frequently invoked in legal disputations.
Similarly, the belief in women's inferiority' in particular skills may
be statistically associated with living in a society that partly or wholly
reserves those skilled occupations for men (let us call such societies
S-societies).Furthermore, byspecifyingin great detail a person's edu
cation, social conditioning, conformist predilections, and so on, that
subjective observation can be made positionally objective from that im
mensely specified position. But these features still do not make that
beliefobjective—notjust trans-positionally,or even from the position
of living'm an S-society. The positional specification in the form of liv
ing in such an S-society is, of course, less than exhaustive. In denying
the positional objectivity of the observation ofwomen's inferiority from
that—underspecified—position, the immediate point is not the trans
positional unobjectivily of the alleged feminine inferiority, nor the fact
that in other societies women are not viewed as being inferior in these
ways. The immediate issue is the non-necessity of taking such a view
offeminine inferiority even for those livingin an S-society. Other—con
trary—views can be taken consistently with living in an S-society, and
the critique of that view can be "internal" (rather than arising from
outside that society).9
5. Positional Judgements and Consequential Ethics
The issue ofpositionality in objectivity arises not only in science and
epistemology, but also in ethics and in the theory ofdecisions. Indeed,
it is precisely in the context of positional etfuVrt/judgements that I had
earlier made a somewhat ad hoc attempt (ad hoc because ofbeing con
fined to ethics) to discuss die merits of the positional interpretation
of objectivity'.10 In this sectionand in the next, I consider two partic
ular issues ofethics to illustrate the relevance of the positional viewof
objectivity in practical reason.
The need for assessing actions in an agent-specific way has been
discussed by several modern philosophers, including Bernard
Williams, Thomas Nagel, Derek Parfit, among others.'' The need for
agent relativity has been seen as an argument against consequcntialist
ethics, for its alleged failure to deal with an important deontologi
cal distinction. To take a much discussed example, there have been
interesting analyses of the ethical difference between (1) killing
someone oneself, and (2) failing to prevent a murder committed by
a third person. The former has been seen, not implausibly, in even
more negative terms than the latter. The relevance of this distinc
tion has been interpreted as evidence of the inadequacy of conse-
quentialism as an ethical approach. Even though the consequences
are "the same" in the two cases (including, a person being murdered),
the ethical case against committing a murder oneself can be said to
be much stronger than that against failing to prevent a murder com
mitted by another person.12
Are the consequences, in fact, the same? It is certainly possible to
construct examples such that the alternative scenarios lead respectively
to two states ofaffairs that are much the same except for the switching
of name tags. While name tags and personal identities do make a dif
ference in the detailed description ofstates ofaffairs, it can be argued
that this difference cannot be significant, in assessing these states ofaf
fairs in a person-neutral way. In each case someone is murtlered and
also someone commits the bad deed ofkilling, and a person-neutral\icw
of the two stales cannot really find them to be critically different from
an ethical point of view.13 And yet, killing someone oneself is seen—
with reason—as a bigger personal failure than non-prevention of a
murder being committed by another. Hence the conclusion that con-
sequentialism must be rejected.
But the entire argument turns on the requirement that conse
quences be evaluated in a person-neutral way, despite the connections
between the agent doing the evaluation and her own roles in the re
spective states of affairs. The dilemma for consequentialism, on this
interpretation, arises from the agent making agent-relative moral
judgements in assessing actions on deontological grounds, but at the
same time being unable to make the corresponding distinctions in the
respectively resulting states of affairs, because of the imposed require
ment ofperson-neutrality injudging states, rather than actions. But why
must an agent, in making a consequentialistjudgement, be person-neu
tral in this way, as if she is viewing the states "from nowhere"?
The issue of positional assessment of states of affairs can be con-
sidered in another way: not in terms of the same person facing twoal
ternative states ofaffairs (involvingtwodifferent actions), as above, but
with twopersons undertaking two different actions facing exactly the
same state of affairs.14 When a murder is committed by person A,
should A and another person B, sharing the same substantive ethical
values, view that state as being equallybad—bad injust the same way
(even though A committed the murder and B did not)? The deonto
logical critique of consequentialism, under discussion,would suggest
that consequentialists must do just that. But whymust consequential-
ists, by virtue of being consequentialists, view the consequences in
eacdy the same way independently of the persons' respective roles in
the states of affairs (including in the actions respectively undertaken)?
Whymust a consequentialist see the consequence "from nowhere"?
By insisting(I believe rightly) on agent-relativity of action morality,
Bernard Williams and others argue in favour of a relevant difference,
in terms of the actions respectively performed, between the murderer
and others—including the non-preventers of the murder. But a simi
lar reasoning strongly suggests that the consequences themselves (in
cluding the actions performed) maynot be viewed in exactlythe same
way bythe murderer as the othersmightbe free to do.15 The positional
view of consequences leads to a consequentialist distinction between
the murderer's moral problems and those of the non-preventers.
The prior requirement of trans-positional invariance of conse
quences amounts to begging the central question, to wit, how should
the consequencesbe viewed byeach person respectively? Forexample,
when Macbeth observesthat "Duncan isin hisgrave"and "Treason has
done his worst," he and LadyMacbeth do indeed have good reasons
to have to view that state of affairs differently from the way the others
can. And they have reason enough to wonder about the actions per
formed, as Lady Macbeth did: "What, will these hands ne'er be clean?"
Similarly, Othello does not have the freedom to see the state ofaffairs
in which Desdemonaliesstrangledin her bed—strangled byher hus
band—in the way others can.
It is quite arbitrary to exclude the possibility ofhaving a special in
terest in—and value ethical responsibility for—one's own actions, in
evaluating states of affairs ofwhich those actions and their effects are
among the constitutive elements. And if this possibility is kept open
(and not arbitrarily closed), then consequential reasoning can easily
accommodate the deontological concerns mentioned earlier. There
isno basicconflict between consequential ethics and this typeof agent
relativity'in judging states and actions.
6. Contracts, Fairness and the Impartial Spectator
The issue of positionality is important in several other contexts in
the discipline ofethical judgements and objectivity. One such context
is the form that fairness and impartiality may take in unbiased ethical
and political analysis.The "contraclarian" viewof justice has come to
much prominence in recent years mainly due to the influence ofJohn
Rawls's far-reachingcontributions.10 His theory of "justiceas fairness"
relies, in essence, on a "fair" compromise between different positional
views that anyone could haveobjectively occupied. In the "original po
sition"—a hypothetical state of primordial equality—the parties are seen
as negotiating a social contract, privileged with some information but
denied other (that relating to particular personal advantages and dis
advantages that each may actually have). In an alternative contractar-
ian approach, Thomas Scanlon has analysed a requirement offairness
without the device of the "original position," but in terms ofselecting
general rules "whichno one can reasonably reject as a basisfor informed,
unforced general agreement."17
While the positionalspecifications and the argumentative discipline
varybetween these different versionsof the contractarian procedure,
they share the general format of looking for a consensus or a negoti
ated setdement between the different "insiders."18 In contrast, Adam
Smith's programme of finding what "the impartial spectator" would
have decided isbased on invokingan "outsider" who takes note ofeach
positional view.19 Adam Smith isreally seeking a correct trans-positional
viewthat would be identified by a sympathetic spectator from outside,
whereas the contractarians are focusing on a negotiatedfair resolution
of the different positional points of view treating each person as a par
ticipant—none an mpartial spectator from outside it all.20
Smith's"imparti.il spectator" belongs to the class of pioneeringideas
of the eighteenth century ofwhich Kant's more systematic and much
more influential analysis of "practical reason" is the pre-eminent ex
ample.21 TheRawlsian analysis andtheentirecontractarian approach
haveclear Kantian connections,22 and in a generic sense there iscon
siderable similarity between the contractarian procedures and the
Smithian procedure involving "the impartial spectator." The Smithian
method has some advantages in terms of reach over the contractarian
procedures, since the achievement of a consensus and a negotiated set
tlement, between a fixedgroup of "insiders," breaks down when deal
ing with problems in which the population itself is a variable. An
outsider in the form ofan "impartial spectator"canmake coherentjudge-
ments even under those circumstances. On the other hand, the ethi
cal force of a social arrangement that is backed by a consensus or ne
gotiated settlement of all the people involved is clearly absent in the
Smithian model involving an impartial spectator. It is not my purpose
here to try to discuss the far-reaching differences between the alter
nativeviews of impartialityand fairness in these distinct approaches,23
but only to point to the role of different positional observations in these
alternative formulations of ethical rationality and objectivity.
7. Decisions, Positions and Subjective Probability
Positional objectivity has an important relevance also in the theory
of rational decisions. The special relevance ofone's objective position
in viewing the prospects and their merits can hardly be ignored. I shall
take up here the problem of choice under uncertainty in general and
the use of so-called "subjective probabilities" in particular.
The term "subjective probability" would seem to indicate a firm de
nial of any claim to objectivity,and it iscertainly true that the concept
is defined entirely in terms of personal degrees of belief and credence
that guide the bets a person is willing to take. And yet a vast decision-
theoretic literature is concerned specifically with the discipline ofhow
to form, modify, oradjust these beliefs, making extensive use ofdemands
of reason and that of objectivity.24 The question is what kind of ob
jectivity?
I shall argue that the classic problem ofdistinguishing between ra
tional conceptions of so-called "subjective" and "objective" probabili
ties can be helpfully analysed in terms of the distinction between
positional and trans-positional objectivity. To illustrate, consider a case
in which you have tossed what we both accept as an even coin. You can
see whether it is head or tail that has come up, but myviewisobscured
byyour palm. Youask me what bets would I take, and thus enquire about
my so-called "subjective probabilities" (as they are defined in the lit
erature) . 11 is easily seen that I cannot sensibly take either a purely sub
jective view or a trans-positionally objective view in deciding on what
bets to take. It would be silly of me to take, say, a l-to-10 bet that it is
a head, since I should know that for an even coin the "chances" don't
favour that bet. There are good reasons for me to restrain my purely
subjective inclinations and to concentrate on being as objective as
possible.
On the other hand, what I have to seek is not objectivity that ig
nores the relevant peculiarities of my oum position. Either head or tail
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has definitely come up and you actually know what it is. In any trans
positional assessment of truth of the kind used in science, your view—
based on seeing the coin—will get understandable priority. But in the
position I am in, I don't know what your viewis any more than I can
observe which way the coin has come up. In deciding on bets, if the
sensible view to take by me—or by anyone else in my position—is to
act on die basis of a reading of a 50-50 chance, then the claim must
be that this view is indeed unprejudiced and objective from my posi
tion. Positional objectivity'is, in this context, exactly what is being sought,
and it has to be clearly distinguished both from subjectivity and from
general trans-positional objectivity.
The distinction between rational use ofobjective and subjective prol>
abilities does not lie in one being based on objective considerations
and the other being divorced from them. They relate, rather, to the
different types of objective considerations that can be invoked in differ
ent contexts. Subjective probabilities may indeed be defined entirely in
terms ofmental attitudes such as beliefs and inclinations, but decision
theory is concerned with the rational use of the information available
to the person in question. The various principles—Bayesian and oth
ers—aimed at guiding the choice of subjective probabilities make ef
fective use of positional objectivity, and that is indeed, I would argue,
the appropriate framework to interpret those exercises.
8. Perceptions, Health and Well-being
Social sciences have to invoke positional points of view for other
reasons as well. This includes the understanding ofbeliefs and actions.
To illustrate, consider the problem of ill health, and in particular, the
contrast between (1) self-perception of health and (2) medical ex
amination by doctors. In some contexts, self-perception itself is part
of the ailment. Having a headache, or experiencing nausea or dizzi
ness, is part of the ill-health itself and not just a symptom of it. A doc
tor can scarcely diagnose that you have pain if you feel none. In these
cases the priority of self-perception would seem to be hard to escape
in arriving at a position-independent assessment.
But in other cases, self-perception can be a difficult basis for the
appraisal of health status and medical conditions. Empirical analysis
based on self-assessment can be plagued by perceptual variations and
volatility, and also by systematic social influences that may make in
terpersonal comparisons particularly problematic.
Self-perceptions can be enormously affected by one's general men-
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tal outlook. Understanding of morbidity is often associated with edu
cation, and the privilegedfrequentlyreport higher incidence ofillness.
There is another connection here that deserves more attention than
it tends to get. Methodical use of medical services both (1) reduces
one's morbidity, and (2) increases the self-perception of morbidity. A
population that goes to see doctors regularlymayenjoy better health,
but at the same time that population will have a clearer awareness of
health deficiencies and ailments. This connection makes international
or interregional comparisons of health conditions based on ques
tionnaires not only misleading, but sometimes perverselyso.
Let me illustrate the point by comparing different states in India.
The state—Kerala—that has the highest level of longevity (a life ex
pectancy at birth of more than 70 years now, in comparison with the
Indian average of 57 years) also has incomparably the highest rate of
reported morbidity. At the other extreme, questionnaires fielded in
the backwards states of Biharand Uttar Pradesh reveala verylowper
ception ofmorbidity but extremely high rates of actual mortality.This
has sometimes been seen as a bit of a mystery.
To disentangle the picture, what is needed is not really to ignore
self-perception—the point of viewof the persons themselves. Quite the
contrary. It is to see that having enormously greater literacy than else
where in India and having the most extensive public health facilities
in the country make the Kerala population more willing and able to
diagnose illnessesand to do something about them in a way that can
not generally happen in much of the rest ofIndia. It is also important
to see that seekingmore medicalattention isnot onlya signof the aware
ness of health condition, it is also a wayof seeking remedy. There is no
real mystery here once the positional conditions are seen as part of the
causal influences that generate and sustain the situation reflected in
the medical statistics.
This line of interpretation can be further extended bycomparing
the reported morbidity rates in India (including Kerala), on the one
hand, and in the USA, on the other, based on comparative surveysof
health perceptions. Such an extension has recendy been made by
Christopher Murray and Lincoln Chen of the Harvard School ofPub
lic Health. In disease by disease comparison, it turns out thatwhile Ker
ala has much higher reported morbidity rates for most illnesses than
the rest of India, the United States has even higher rates for the same
illnesses. If we were to go by self-reported morbidity, we would have
to conclude that the USAis the least healthy in this comparison, fol
lowed by Kerala, with the rest of India enjoying a much higher level
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of health—led by the states that are most backward in education and
health facilities, such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh!
The alternative is to understand the positional features in the sys
tematic perceptions of morbidity, relating understanding and knowl
edge to the particular circumstances of the self-observers. This does not
deny the possibility of trans-positional objectivity in assessing health con
ditions, typing up medical observations with perceptual information,
but that is a distinct problem that has to be addressed on its own and
must not be confused with positionally determined health perceptions.
9. Gender Inequality and Positional Perceptions
To take another example, nowhere is the importance of positional
interpretation as crucial as it is in understanding gender inequality'.
The working of families involvesa mixture ofcongruence and conflict
of interests in the division of benefits and chores, but the demands of
family livingrequire that the conflicting aspects be resolved implicitly,
rather than through explicit bargaining. Dwelling on such conflicts
would generally be seen as aberrant behaviour. Instead, in day-to-day
practice, conventional codes of conduct are simplytaken as legitimate
(usuallyby implication rather than by any explicit enunciation), and
a derived perception of fairnessand equity in the distributive arrange
ments plays an importantcausal role in the success of family living.25
Given these conditions, it is very hard to challenge received gen
der inequalities, and indeed even to identify them clearly as inequal
ities that demand attention. To discuss another illustration from India,
the questionnaire method of getting the views of rural women them
selves on their experience of gender inequality has typically failed to
find any strong perception ofdisparityor inequity. This has sometimes
been interpreted asa proofof the absence ofa "real"gender inequality
in rural India. It has even led to the suggestion that raising the ques
tion of gender inequality in this context amounts to the planting of
an alien notion in an illegitimate wayinto the harmony of Indian rural
living.
And yet in terms ofvarious criteria ofmortality rates, literacy rates,
nutrition-related diseases, etc., women emerge as being systematically
underprivilegedvis-a-vis men in rural India.The interest in the systematic
absence of perceptions of gender inequality does not lie in its trans-
positional objectivity, but in its reflection of the positionally con
strained views that are shared and accepted. Indeed, the perception
of harmony (even on the part of the rural Indian woman themselves)
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contributes to the causal influences sustaining gender inequality, rather
than contradictingthe existence of that inequality.
There is also a dissonance between the ranking of perceived mor
bidity and that ofobserved mortality between men and women—simi
lar to that between die Indian slates on which I commented earlier. Indian
women tend to have a higher mortality rale than Indian men for all age
groups (after a short neo-natal period of some months) up to the ages
of 35 to 40 years.And yel the reported morbidity rates, which are par
asitic on self-perception (for reasons discussed in section 8 above), of
women are typically no higher—sometimes much lower—than those
of men. This is not only a reflection of women's deprivation in educa
tion, but also of the acceptance of greater discomfort and illness as a
pari of the prevailing mode of living. On an earlier occasion, I have dis
cussed the remarkable fact that in a studyof post-famineBengal in 1944,
widows had hardly reported any incidence of being in "indifferent
health" whereas widowmcomplained massively about just that.26
The perception of seriousness of diseases and of the need to seek
professional medical attention also affects actions. There is evidence
of systematically less use of hospital facilities by women vis-a-vis men
(and bygirlsvis-a-vis boys) in India, even in majorcities.27 As argued
earlier in the context ofdiscussing positional perceptions ofill health,
less frequent use of the medical services simultaneously (1) decreases
reported morbidity, and (2) increases vulnerability to disease.
Byconstraining the positional parameters verythoroughly, it would
be possible to attribute positionalobjectivity to the Indian rural women's
lack of sense of relative deprivation in health or well-being. That posi
tional objectivity has importance in understanding self-perceptions of
Indian women, and also in explaining various actions and non-ac
tions. On the other hand, thispositionalobjectivity, achieved thorough
extensive constraining, would not readilytranslate into trans-positional
objectivity of women's relative deprivation, nor into positional objectivity
from the general position of being an Indian rural woman (as discussed
in section 4 earlier).
I have confined mycomments on gender inequality here to India
only, but similar statements can be made about most of the develop
ing countries in South Asiaand West Asia, and also about China.28At
a different level,a similaranalysis has relevance to gender inequalities
in the richer countries of Europe and America as well. The relevant
disparities there maynot relate to such elementary matters as morbidity
and mortality, but to other fields, such as unequal divisions ofdomestic
chores, inequalities in the responsibility for child care and the op-
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portunity to accept full-time outside employment, disparities in pro
fessional ambition and encouragement, and so on.
The importance of positionality can be enormous in understand
ing health, well-being, and relative deprivation. The distorted obser
vations are not proof of their trans-positional truth or objectivity, but
nor are they dismissable as purely subjective features of the persons
involved. They are systematic and patterned, and can hardlybe attributed
to whims and quirks of mental manufacture or to purely personal pe
culiarities. The positionalityof perspectives—andthe idea of objectivity
within those perspectives—provides a framework in terms ofwhich these
systematic findings can be analysed and understood.
10. A Concluding Remark
The importance of positionalityin observations has been the main
theme of this paper, and in that context, objectivity' has been seen in
both positionaland trans-positional'terms. Parametric positional variability
is a general feature of all observations and is central to the process of
acquiring of knowledge. Objectivitycannot do without positional ob
servations. While this is just as true in the natural sciences as it is in
the social sciences or in ethics or in decision theory, the significance
ofpositional variations can be very different—in some waysmore cen
tral—in the latter contexts. The subject matter of social sciences,
ethics, decision theory requires us to take, for various reasons, a direct
interest in the positional observations.
To try to see the claims of different perspectives merely in terms
ofthe conflicting demands of "objectivity" and "relativity" (assome stand
ard formulations of the dispute tend to suggest) is to miss something
central in the nature of knowledgeand practical reason. The relationship
is not like that at all.
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